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Quality Assurance Mechanisms in an E-commerce Platform Sales: The
Moderating Effect of Quality Disclosure Transparency
Tiantian Yao, Zhen Zhu
School of Economics and Management,
China University of Geosciences, Wuhan, 430074, China
Abstract: Based on the two-dimensional classification of quality assurance mechanisms, this study capitalizes on an
adjustment event of quality disclosure strategy on Ctrip.com in June 2017, and uses the sales data of online outbound
package tour products to investigate the impact of transparency of quality disclosure on sales, as well as its moderating effect
on the relationship between eWOM valence and sales. We uncover following interesting findings as follows. First, the
valence of eWOM has a curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship with sales. Second, the transparency of quality
disclosure has a positive moderating effect. Our study reveals how the information transparency strategy influence the
development of the platform ecosystem.

Keywords: E-commerce platform, Quality assurance mechanism, Quality disclosure, Information transparency strategy,
Platform governance

1.

INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of Internet technologies, e-commerce platforms are becoming the leading

innovators in China economy. However, the separation of buyers and sellers in time and space leads to the
asymmetry of product quality disclosure and opportunistic behavior of complementors. In digital markets,
quality assurance mechanisms, designed by e-commerce platforms, ensure the consumers’ right of knowing the
quality information of products.
Dranove and Jin[1] classified quality assurance mechanisms into two categories: self-generated quality
assurance and certification-based quality disclosure. Electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM) is a common
self-generated quality assurance. eWOM, generated by buyers, reduces the quality signal deviation introduced
by the self-reported information (such as advertisements and product introductions of sellers), before the
purchasing. The quality information in eWOM is easy to be recognized and accepted by consumers. It becomes
a crucial regulatory approach for e-commerce platforms to promote product quality management. In addition,
quality disclosure from third parties such as industry associations, governments, and professional organizations
is the another important quality assurance mechanism[2]. However, due to the lack of professional certification
capabilities, e-commerce platforms are still exploring how to promote quality disclosure. Current platform
quality supervision is still in a background mode, which is obscure to consumers (such as the examinations
before suppliers entering the platform), also there is no mature and effective front-end disclosure solution.
Moreover, the opacity of quality disclosure mechanisms made consumers not well aware of the effectiveness of
them, and even doubtful about them. Therefore, it may be an effective strategy to strengthen consumer
awareness by improving the transparency of quality disclosure.
In fact, certification-based quality disclosure mechanisms benefit from strong market power and
administrative norms. By continuously improving the transparency of quality disclosure, relevant quality
assurance signals are strengthened in market transactions, platform governance, and the processes of consumer
identification. However, transparent quality disclosure yields a significant crowding out effect on low-quality
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products, further inhibits the network effects in the two-sided market and negatively affects the market share of
the platform. Therefore, for some growing e-commerce platforms, it is necessary to be very cautious when
deciding which transparency strategy of assurance mechanism to use. Previous literature has confirmed that
e-commerce platforms could reshape business models by adjusting pricing strategies and improving competition
mechanisms based on information elements, such as product, price, cost, inventory, and process[3, 4]. Most
existing researches focus on the role of price transparency strategies in B2C and B2B markets, while there are
little researches on the transparency of product quality disclosure. Thus, our research questions are: 1) how does
quality disclosure transparency of the platform affect online sales and 2) how does it affect the relationship
between self-generated quality assurance and online sales?
This study capitalizes on the opportunity of a quality disclosure strategy adjustment on Ctrip.com in June
2017 and uses online sales data of outbound package tour products. The results confirmed the positive
moderating effect of the transparency of quality disclosure. This paper offers more choices of non-price strategy
in platform governance, and applies the information transparency theory to the new context of product quality
governance on e-commerce platforms. We also provide a new evidence of the impact of information
transparency strategy on the development of platform ecosystem.
2.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS

2.1 Two types of quality assurance mechanisms
Quality assurance mechanisms are a set of management strategies designed to disclose quality information.
Quality assurance mechanisms can be classified into two categories: self-generated quality assurance and
certification-based quality disclosure[1]. The former mainly delivers product quality information to consumers
through brands, guarantees and word of mouth. The latter is defined as an effort by a certification agency to
systematically measure and report product quality. The comparison of these two types of quality assurance
mechanisms is shown in Table 1. As indicated in this table, the quality information of self-generated quality
assurance tends to describe the horizontal product dimensions, thus consumers can find products that best meet
their idiosyncratic needs. The quality information provided by certification-based quality disclosure is about
vertical product attributes. The quality of the product can be judged based on the quality disclosure information.
These two mechanisms complement each other in the transmission of quality signals.
Table1 Comparison of two quality assurance mechanisms
Self-generated
mechanism

quality

Certification-based
mechanism

quality

disclosure

Transmit quality signals to consumers

Common

Difference

assurance

Signal source

Enterprises, consumers

third-party certifiers, industries or governments

Information verifiability

difficult to verify

easy to check

Information credibility

need to be identified

relatively reliable

Information representation

non-standardized, different forms

standardization, may be not detailed

Relationship with quality

indirectly clarify product quality

directly explain the quality parameters

Disclosure of information

partially, one aspect will be more

attributes

detailed

overall, more concentrated

2.2 Quality assurance mechanisms in e-commerce platforms
As an important self-generated quality assurance mechanism, and valence is considered as a the most
representative metric of eWOM [5]. Low valence indicates a negative attitude of customers on the product, while
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high valence indicates a positive one. According to expectation-confirmation theory[6], post-purchase
satisfaction of a product is the function of expectation, perceived performance, and disconfirmation of belief. In
e-commerce platforms, the low valence of a product is associated with low consumer satisfaction of the product
quality. A severe mismatch between product quality expectation and perception leads to a reduction in product
purchase desires. As valence increases, the gap between the expectation quality and the actual perception quality
decreases. It indicates that the lower quality uncertainty conveyed by valence leads to higher consumers’
purchase desire. However, when valence is extremely high, due to the consumer's previous experiences of
quality fraud, there may be a mismatch between pre-purchase quality expectations and post-purchase perceived
performance, and consumers subconsciously suspect high valence[7], which in turn reduces the possibility of
purchase. Thus, we propose following hypothesis:
H1: The relationship between valence and online sales is inverted U-shaped.
Quality disclosure is a non-price platform governance strategy that includes design content and information
transparency. This paper focuses on the latter. An increasing transparency of information leads to an increasing
in information visibility and a decreasing consumer uncertainty on product perception[8]. It helps consumers
differentiate product quality and guides them to make rational purchase decisions, and it is easier to find
products that meet their needs, which results in higher purchase intentions. Thus, we propose following
hypothesis:
H2: The higher the transparency of quality disclosure, the higher the online sales of products.
Two quality assurance mechanisms yield complementary effect in the dimensions of signal source,
information verifiability, credibility, expression, and disclosure attributes. In this study, quality disclosure
transparency is the extent to which consumers can perceive and acquire when the platform uses product
transparency strategies to disclose quality information. The quality certification information reflects the vertical
product attributes as a quality signal, but the information obtained by consumers is different in different
transparency environments. When the transparency of quality disclosure is high, there will be more quality
information of platform certification disclosure. Then, it can play the role of “quality endorsement”, so will the
reliability of valence be further verified. Conversely, the quality endorsement doesn’t play its role in an opaque
platform environment. Thus, we propose following hypothesis:
H3: Compared to the lower quality transparency strategy, the higher transparency strategy mitigates
the inverted U-shaped relationship between valence and online sales.
3.

DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

3.1 Data and Measures
We use the data from the largest travel e-commerce platform in China——Ctrip.com. The platform
implemented a new quality disclosure strategy at the end of June 2017. The updated quality disclosure strategy
re-evaluates the core service elements of all the products in the transportation, hotel, travel experience,
restaurants and shopping arrangements, and built a new rating scheme. Therefore, the quality disclosure was
more transparent. We collected data of outbound package tour products that leave from 15 major domestic cities
and target at 15 major outbound destinations. The data includes the number of tourists, valence, volume, prices,
and season. The data was collected by a script every half month from March 2017 to October 2017.
The panel-level mode is specified in following equation:
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Where

, is the number of tourists of product i during t period,

product i as of the t period,

is the average score of the

is a dummy variable of the disclosure transparency. It is recorded as 0 before

the event and 1 after the event. We also controlled the season factor, product price and review volume. We use
dummy variables to capture the change of seasons. March and April belong to the first quarter (
May, June and July belong to the second quarter (
third quarter (

).

), and August, September and October belong to the

is the listed price of product i in t period.

reviews of product i in t period.

),

is the number of

are the regression coefficients and intercept term of the model.

is

the composite error term.
3.2 Results
We use "OLS + robust standard error" method to avoid heteroscedasticity and further use fixed effect
model to estimate the regression parameters. The results of step-by-step regression are shown in Table 1. Model
2 shows that the coefficients of primary and secondary terms of valence are negatively significant. This result
indicates that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between valence and sales of the tourism products. As
valence increases, sales first increase and then decrease. The symmetric axis of the quadratic curve is 4.1. Thus,
H1 is supported. Model 3 shows that the coefficient of quality disclosure transparency is significantly positive,
thus H2 is supported. The results of Model 4 and Model 5 show that the transparency of quality disclosure has a
positive moderating effect on valence, thus H3 is supported. Figure 1 is presented in order to further clarify the
moderating effect. The steep curve tends to gentle as the transparency of quality disclosure decreases. The
direction of the curve opening is unchanged, and the elasticity becomes smaller.
Table 1 Estimation results
Variables
Constant

Model 1
FE
1.704***
(0.151)

Model 2
FE
1.874***
(0.147)

Model 3
FE
1.833***
(0.150)

Model 4
FE
1.999***
(0.147)

Model 5
FE
1.947***
(0.144)

0.063***
(0.005)
0.253***
(0.008)
0.041*
(0.018)
0.636***
(0.013)

0.062***
(0.005)
0.245***
(0.008)
0.039*
(0.018)
0.591***
(0.013)

0.041***
(0.005)
0.178***
(0.007)
0.025
(0.018)
0.627***
(0.013)

0.041***
(0.005)
0.173***
(0.007)
0.024
(0.018)
0.583***
(0.013)

0.045***
(0.005)
0.183***
(0.006)
0.026
(0.017)
0.569***
(0.013)

-6.429***
(0.716)
-1.623***
(0.123)

——

-6.391***
(0.712)
-1.607***
(0.123)

-6.301***
(0.693)
-1.568***
(0.123)

0.086***
(0.005)

0.175***
(0.012)

66403
0.551

4.931***
(0.503)
1.054***
(0.067)
66403
0.561

Control variables
Season_2
Season_3
lnPrice
lnVolume
Independent variable
(lnValence)2
lnValence

——

Moderator
PIT

0.089***
(0.005)

Interaction
(lnValence)2×PIT
lnValence×PIT
N
66403
66403
R2
0.533
0.546
Note: standard errors in parentheses, *p <0.05, ** p <0.01, ***p <0.001

66403
0.538
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Figure 1. Moderating effect of quality disclosure transparency

4.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
We have three main conclusions. First, as a self-generated quality assurance mechanism, valence has an

inverted U-shaped effect on the online sales of outbound package tour products. It confirms the non-linear effect
of valence on online sales, and provides an important evidence for the effectiveness of online quality signals of
different products. Second, increased transparency in quality disclosure contributes to online sales growth. Our
study applies the information transparency theory to the product quality governance research of e-commerce
platforms, and provides a new evidence for the impact of information transparency strategy on the development
of the platform ecology. Third, the increase in transparency of quality disclosure can greatly strengthen the
relationship between valence and online sales. It broadens the views of platform product quality governance and
supplements the research on non-price strategy in platform governance.
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